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Abstract. Knowledge requires more than mere true belief, and we also tend to think it is more 
valuable. I explain the added value knowledge contributes if its extra ingredient beyond true 
belief is tracking. I show that the tracking conditions are the unique conditions on knowledge 
that achieve for those who fulfill them a strict Nash Equilibrium and an Evolutionarily Stable 
Strategy in what I call the True Belief game. The added value of these properties, intuitively, 
includes preparedness and an expectation of survival advantage. On this view knowledge is 
not valuable because knowledge persists, but because it makes the bearer more likely to 
maintain an appropriate belief state – possibly non-belief – through time and changing 
circumstances. When Socrates concluded that knowledge of the road to Larissa was no more 
valuable than true belief for the purpose of getting to Larissa, he did not take into account 
that one might want to be prepared for a possible meeting with a misleading sophist along the 
way, or for the possibility of road work. 
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It is thought that externalist views of what knowledge is – that do not require conscious 
access to reasons and arguments but only certain relations in which a person’s belief must 
stand to the world – have trouble explaining why knowledge is more valuable than mere true 
belief. Justificatory arguments are intrinsically valuable, some say, but what additional 
epistemic worth could another relation of your belief to the external world have if the belief 
already has the relation of being true? (Swinburne 1999, 2000 , Kvanvig 2003) 
This surely depends on what the further relation is. The value problem, or “Swamping 
Problem” as it is called since the property of truth of the belief seems to swamp in 
significance other external relations, appears particularly acute for process reliabilism, but 
process reliabilism is not the only externalist view. Besides truth the process reliabilist puts 
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constraints only on the history of formation of a belief, but once you actually have a true 
belief the extra property of its having been formed in a certain way seems otiose. According 
to the standard comparison, a beautiful chair does not have additional aesthetic worth for 
having been produced by a process that produces beautiful chairs most of the time.ii If these 
points stand, then the swamping problem appears to afflict all historical views of knowledge. 
However, not all externalist views of knowledge are historical. Counterfactual views 
do not impose conditions on the genesis of a belief. They put conditions on how the belief is 
currently disposed to behave or fare in scenarios different from the actual one. The distinction 
here is analogous to the difference between how the solar system was formed and what laws 
govern its motions. The laws govern the motion of a planet at every point in time, even if the 
planet is not in fact moving. The history of its formation is a different matter; it will conform 
with these laws but involve a lot more information, about initial conditions for example. This 
is where the analogy ends, of course, for we, unlike the law-governed physical world, are 
capable of forming beliefs by processes that are not well-behaved in the relevant way, and of 
forming beliefs that do not conform in their dispositions to any epistemologically nice 
counterfactual properties. The point is that these are distinct failures. Even if there are 
correlations between them in the actual world, as there probably are, those would be 
contingent relationships. The first failure is a defect of the process of forming a belief, the 
second a defect in the product. The process reliabilist thinks that the first type of failure – 
formation by a process that does not tend to produce true beliefs – is what deprives a belief of 
the status of knowledge even if it happens to be true. A counterfactualist thinks the failure of 
a true belief to be knowledge is a defect in the dispositions that accompany the fully formed 
belief. 
Since ascription of a counterfactual concerning a belief is ascription of a current 
property, counterfactual views of knowledge are “current time-slice” views, in Alvin 
Goldman’s terminology (Goldman 1979), a property they share with traditional internalist 
justified-belief views. Accordingly, the value problem for these views looks entirely different 
from that for process reliabilism. Here the question becomes whether a person’s disposition 
to believe or not believe a proposition p in non-actual situations could add value when she 
already actually has a true belief in p. It is clear intuitively that counterfactuals might have 
something to offer here. After all, your spouse’s not actually having an affair with Mr. or Ms. 
X is a good thing, but it would surely be strictly better if it were also the case that he or she 
wouldn’t have that affair even if offered a million dollars. The latter is evidently not 
swamped by the former. 
Love might be a case where the counterfactual enhances an intrinsic kind of value. I 
am going to argue that if knowledge requires tracking then it enhances the extrinsic value of a 
true belief, the value it has for achieving or obtaining other things. That is, it will turn out that 
Socrates was wrong to think that knowledge of which road went to Larissa would be no more 
valuable than mere true belief about it. I will show that the additional dispositional properties 
required by the tracking view of knowledge, formulated using conditional probabilities rather 
than counterfactuals, add payoff and survival value necessarily and that no other conditions 
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on knowledge have the property that ensures this necessarily. This follows because tracking 
is the unique Nash Equilibrium and Evolutionarily Stable Strategy in what I will call the True 
Belief Game. 
Intuitively, what fulfillment of the tracking conditions adds to the truth of a belief is a 
kind of robustness against contingencies. What can be questioned in taking this analysis as a 
resolution of the value problem is whether robustness of a person’s belief behavior as the 
subject is faced with a world that evolves over time is of value to a person at the time of 
holding the belief. I will discuss this after explaining the kind of robustness in question. 
To begin, consider the situation of a person playing a game with the world, which I 
will call Nature, on a single occasion. Nature can play p or –p, p a proposition, and the person 
can play B(p), that is, believe p, or play -B(p), that is, not believe p. Suppose the person’s 
payoffs are positive if she plays B(p) when Nature plays p, and positive when she plays -B(p) 
to Nature’s -p, and they are negative when she plays -B(p) to Nature’s p and when she plays 
B(p) to Nature’s -p. These payoffs express the conditions that when p is true, it is more 
valuable to the subject to believe p than not to believe p, and when p is false it is more 
valuable to the subject to not believe p than to believe p. The results I am explaining are 
limited to these conditions, but that is not a limitation on their application to the value 
problem. There are plenty of p for which it is more valuable to have a false belief than a true 
belief or no belief – think of crazy metaphysical beliefs that come bundled with other, true, 
beliefs holding all of which is required to cement your relation to your social group, and 
consider a situation – of pioneers, for example – where survival depends on membership in a 
group. However, these cases of p for which true beliefs are not valuable are not relevant to 
the value problem under discussion here, which is to say whether or how given that true 
belief is valuable, knowledge has added value. Anyway, cases of p for which true beliefs are 
not valuable are not cases where we expect knowledge to be valuable either. 
Nature is indifferent to what you play when it plays p or -p. It gains nothing and loses 
nothing, so in our first pass here we are dealing with a degenerate game: 
 
 
 
 
 B(p) -B(p) 
p (0, 2) (0, -3) 
-p (0, -1) (0, 3) 
 
Nature is the player choosing a row, and the subject is the player choosing a column. The 
winning strategy for the subject is to play B(p) when Nature plays p and to play -B(p) when 
Nature plays –p, which is reflected in the payoffs in the four possible situations written as 
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ordered pairs with the subject’s payoffs second. iii The word “strategy” does not imply, in this 
or any other game I will discuss here, conscious or consciously accessible planning, or even 
thought. It is simply an intuitive term for what the player does; later in the discussion 
strategies will be rules in accord with which players act in a given round of play, and we will 
discuss dispositions to act in accord with a given rule, but doing or having any of these does 
not require conscious access to them either. We do not assume that the subject knows (or 
does not know) what Nature played before playing B(p) or -B(p).iv Nor are the players 
assumed to know the structure of the game or their or their opponent’s payoff structure. We 
think merely of which of their options each of the players play, and what they get when they 
do. This game can thus be compared with Floridi’s more sophisticated Knowledge Game 
(2005). Here we will see how knowledge emerges from a game in which the object is true 
belief and no knowledge of any sort is assumed. There common knowledge is assumed in 
order to show how second-order knowledge that one is conscious can emerge from the fact 
that there is a game one can win that a zombie could not, and that one can see that one can 
win it and a zombie could not. 
This simple game is a way of formulating what is essential in forming beliefs about 
matters like p in situations where the truth of p matters positively to us; it formulates the 
starting point of the value problem. The game expresses the assumption that at a given time a 
true belief about p is not trivially acquired and is valuable by saying that whether p is true or 
false is not determined by the subject, but by a different player, Nature, and that a correct 
belief state about p (whether that means believing it or not believing it) has positive value for 
the subject; it makes her win the game and achieves her best possible outcome given Nature’s 
play.  
Thus, the assumption that a merely true belief has value can be represented as a 
certain kind of payoff structure in a one-shot game played with Nature. In real life, even with 
a single p, this game would often be repeated over time. The truth value of p may change; the 
tiger may be gone today, but back tomorrow. We will imagine this repeated play with p and -
p understood as states of the world, and belief and absence of belief in p understood as acts of 
the subject. I will represent this as a more elaborate type of game, which I will introduce 
using an example about something other than belief. In this game, the states of the world may 
be different at each round of play, and the players may opt for different acts at each round of 
play. If we also imagine messages interposed between states of the world and acts of the 
subject, then we have what David Lewis called a “Signaling Game.” (Lewis 1969) Such a 
game has the following kind of structure 
 
States of World Messages Sent Acts 
p m1 Watching football 
q m2 Self-reflection 
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There is a Sender and a Receiver in the game, and each will have payoffs associated with 
strategies for responding to scenarios. Sender is defined by her repertoire of possible plays: 
here either m1 or m2 when Nature sets p or q. Receiver is defined by his repertoire of possible 
acts, here Watching football or Self-reflection, when Sender plays m1 or m2. In order for 
there to be a game of this sort, Sender and Receiver must each have the capacity for a variety 
of rules of responding when the other player plays in each of the possible ways he might. 
Thus, if the possible messages are m1 and m2, Sender must be able to respond by taking p to 
one of these, and taking q to one of these. Sender may send both states to one message or 
send p and q to different messages and it still be a signaling game. Similarly Receiver must 
have the ability to act either of his two ways, Watching Football or Self-reflection, and in any 
of the four possible permutations of rules for responding to each of m1 and m2. 
A full set of such rules, that is, that covers the possibilities a player may be paired 
with, is called a strategy. Thus Sender’s strategy is a set of two rules, for example, T1: 
 
p  m2 
q  m1 
 
Likewise for Receiver, for example, L1: 
m1  Watch football 
m2  Watch Football 
 
 
 
In a picture: 
 
States of World  Messages Sent    Act 
p     m1    Watch football 
q     m2    Self-reflection 
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Sender and Receiver each have a repertoire of other possible strategies that is easy to list: 
 
T2: p  m1 q  m1 
T3: p  m2 q  m2 
T4: p  m1 q  m2 
   
L2: m1  Self-reflection m2  Self-reflection 
L3: m1  Watch football m2  Self-reflection 
L4: m1  Self-Reflection m2  Watch football 
 
 
We can assess all possible outcomes for Sender and Receiver in this game by looking at the 
payoffs for their possible strategies when each is paired with each possible strategy of the 
other player. This is because a strategy pair, one from each player, determines what each will 
do whether the world is p or the world is q, the only two world states stipulated to be relevant 
to our game.  
Thus, we consider payoffs for all combinations of T1, T2, T3, T4 with L1, L2, L3, L4. If 
we were modeling an actual situation we would take these payoffs from the facts. How nice 
or nasty is a certain consequence for a given player, and how likely is that consequence if he 
plays a particular way and the other player plays a particular way? In this example I will 
make the payoffs up, to illustrate some key points. 
 
 
 L1 L2 L3 L4 
T1 (-1, 2) (2, 0) (-2, -1) (2, 0) 
T2 (-2, -2) (0, 3) (-1, 2) (2, -1) 
T3 (0, 1) (2, -1) (-1, 2) (1, -2) 
T4 (-2, -1) (2, -1) (3, -2) (-2, 1) 
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The first number of each ordered pair is the payoff for Sender when she plays the strategy to 
the left, and the second is what Receiver gets when he plays the strategy at the top of that 
row. The numbers could be anything, but the ones I have entered for the current example 
imply that, for example, if Sender plays T3 and Receiver plays L2 then Sender gains 2 and 
Receiver loses 1. If Receiver plays L4 to Sender’s T4, Receiver gains 1 and Sender loses 2. A 
feature that I have written in to this particular assignment of payoffs is that there is no one 
combination of plays (square in the table) that will have both Sender and Receiver better off 
compared to their other options in that row or column respectively. This implies that if we set 
Sender and Receiver to play the game in perpetuity, neither of them would settle on one 
strategy out of their repertoire.v 
Although the definition of these games does not involve any assumption of 
intentionality, knowledge, or information transmission, the terms “message,” “sender” and 
“receiver” are meant to be suggestive. This is because phenomena we recognize as 
information transmission can arise naturally out of the games. We can see how by looking at 
what the scenario just imagined means intuitively. Suppose Sender plays T1 and Receiver L1, 
as in the picture above. Sender’s dispositions in T1 mean she is cued in to there being a 
difference between p and q and is revealing that difference by differentiating between them in 
a uniform way in the messages she sends out. Receiver’s dispositions in L1 mean he does not 
register that difference in his act of Watching football or Self-reflection. Receiver’s 
indifference to the distinction between m1 and m2 in his responding act makes the 
information about the state of the world, p or q, unavailable to Receiver; we could say that he 
is not listening. According to our payoff table, and assuming a simple dynamics, it follows 
that this set of dispositions is not a configuration our two players would stably end up in, 
since though it is beneficial to Receiver not to hear (+2), it is detrimental for Sender not to be 
heard (-1), and this is not better than all the players’ other options. We can imagine this as a 
realistic case where Sender has an interest in communicating and Receiver has an interest in 
not hearing. Since every other square also involves some analogous mismatch of best interest, 
it follows that, other things equal, this relationship will not become stable no matter how 
many rounds they play. 
 
The basic condition under which they would become stable is there being a square 
where both receive the highest payoff they could get given the strategy the other has played. 
This would happen here, for example, if the top left corner had the payoffs (4, 4). If in the 
course of play the players happen on such a combination, and stick with it for a while, then 
they will become stable and resiliently wedded to the corresponding strategies indefinitely. 
That there be a possibility of stable convergence depends on there being a payoff 
possibility reflecting common interest. However, there being a common interest does not 
imply that the interest is in what we would intuitively call communication, or information 
transmission. Witness that nothing prevented us imagining the highest mutual payoff in the 
square T1, L1where Sender makes information available, but in fact is never heard. A strategy 
combination where Sender talks into the wind can become stable as long as Sender is 
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satisfactorily rewarded in it. Whether a stabilizable configuration is also communicative 
depends on which strategies in fact have the highest payoffs. Thus, the issue of stability and 
the issue of communication are conceptually independent. 
The reason the new payoff structure leads to convergence to a single set of strategies 
is that if the top left corner is (4,4), then this option dominates every other possible set of 
strategies. That is, it is better, for both players, than any other option either of them has. This 
dominating ordered pair of strategies is called a Strict Nash Equilibrium, and such a pair of 
strategies in a signaling game is called a Signaling System. As we have just seen, not every 
signaling system will lead to what we would intuitively call communication or information 
transmission.  
The strategy pairs in our game that would intuitively correspond to information 
transmission are <T1, L3>, <T1, L4>, <T4, L3>, <T4, L4>. In all of them Sender can tell, and 
signals, the difference between p and q, and Receiver can distinguish those messages and 
respond differentially. Notice that the messages m1, m2 have no preassigned meanings. As 
long as Sender consistently sends the same message for p each time and q each time, and 
sends different messages for p and q, it does not matter which of m1 or m2 she uses in which 
role. As far as whether it is possible to achieve a signaling system or information transfer the 
qualities of m1 and m2 are conventional. Receiver will be able to cotton on to p versus q if he 
has available a strategy that can respond differentially to m1 and m2. 
Responding differently to p and q is one thing, one might say, but what about 
responding correctly? If the character of the messages is completely conventional, couldn’t 
Receiver get his responses to p and q exactly the wrong way around? The answer is No. 
Which is the right response to p for Receiver is determined by his payoff structure – how 
good is it for him when he watches football in the situation p? But his payoff structure also 
determines which combined sets of strategies of him and his playmate can become stable 
Signaling Systems. Thus, here are the four possible intuitively communicative Signaling 
Systems in our game: 
 
 T1, L3 
p     m1     Watch football 
q     m2     Self-reflection 
 
T1, L4 
p     m1     Watch football 
q     m2     Self-reflection 
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T4, L3 
p     m1     Watch football 
q     m2     Self-reflection 
 
T4, L4 
 
p     m1     Watch football 
q     m2     Self-reflection 
 
Suppose it is appropriate for Receiver to respond to state p by Watching football and to q by 
Self-reflection. These assumptions will be reflected in his payoffs. His rewards will be 
highest, among all the possibilities, for <T1, L4> and <T4, L3>. The rewards will be the same 
for both of those strategies because each has him successfully responding to p with Watching 
football and to q with Self-reflection; it doesn’t matter which message route he took to get 
there. Accordingly, if all of these communicative solutions are winners for Sender, then, 
according to theorems, Sender and Receiver will be stable in either of <T1, L4> and <T4, L3>. 
Receiver will have a system in which he is able to make what is for him the appropriate 
response to p, because the appropriateness will be reflected in his payoffs, and which system 
is stable, if any, is determined by the payoffs for him and the other player. 
To model the task of getting true beliefs about the physical world as a signaling game 
with two players and repeated play, we take the possible States of the World to be p and -p. 
We take Sender to be the laws of Nature, those things that determine which indicators flow 
downstream from the State of the World, p or –p. Receiver is a player about whom we 
stipulate the values of true belief, false belief, and no belief as in the value problem about 
knowledge, thus, as in the very first table above. Sender and Receiver each have four possible 
strategies: 
Sender: 
N1: p  M1 -p  M2 
N2: p  M1 -p  M1 
N3: p  M2 -p  M1 
N4: p  M2 -p  M2 
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Receiver: 
K1: M1  B(p) M2  - B(p) 
K2: M1  -B(p) M2  -B(p) 
K3: M1  B(p) M2  B(p) 
K4: M1  -B(p) M2  B(p) 
 
 K1 K2 K3 K4 
N1 (0, 4) (0, 1) (0, -2) (0, -5) 
N2 (0, -1) (0, -1) (0, -1) (0, -1) 
N3 (0, -5) (0, 1) (0, 1) (0, 4) 
N4 (0, -1) (0, -1) (0, -1) (0, -1) 
 
 
The payoffs in this table are not assigned by thinking of values as possessed by the strategies, 
but as possessed by particular types of outcomes, in our case the reward or punishment for 
the having or lacking of a true belief. The payoffs could not belong to the strategies per se, 
because those achieve different payoffs depending on the strategy played by the other player. 
We assume that a merely true, particular belief p occurring at a particular time is valuable, 
more valuable than no belief when p is true, etc., and payoffs in our tables always refer to that 
level of fact. A strategy, which I will eventually associate with that part of knowledge that 
goes beyond true belief, is obviously instrumentally valuable insofar as it actually gives you 
one of these valuable things. However, that fact alone would not resolve the swamping 
problem, since it would still be the case that if you had that true belief you wouldn’t need that 
instrument. What I will eventually show is that a strategy, which in a distinctive way attaches 
to an actual true belief, adds value beyond that which comes from the truth of the particular 
belief it is a good tool for getting.  
Assuming true belief, false belief, and no belief have the relative values we stipulated 
at the start, the worst combinations for our subject would be <N3, K1> and <N1, K4>. Both 
combinations have Receiver believing p when it is false and not believing when p is true, and 
those belief states are bad for him. The best combinations for Receiver are <N1, K1> and <N3, 
K4>, since in these cases Receiver believes p when it is true and does not believe p when it is 
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false, and those outcomes are good for him. In our True Belief game Receiver’s payoffs 
happen to be the worst and the best respectively in these two strategy sets. 
Whether a repeated game of this kind converges to a stable signaling system also 
depends on the payoffs of the other player, who in our case is Nature. It is commonplace in 
proving epistemological convergence theorems to assume that Nature is cooperative in 
making separating evidence available, that is, in providing distinct indicators of distinct states 
of affairs. We cannot expect a subject to gain information about Nature if she obfuscates. The 
question is then whether the subject’s tools will enable him to find or use the messages 
appropriately. Here this assumption will correspond to Nature’s having a preference to play 
strategy N1 or N3, indifferently between the two, regardless of anything else, since in those 
two strategies, and only those, distinct messages are given for distinct states of affairs. 
Writing that in: 
 
 K1 K2 K3 K4 
N1 (1, 4) (1, 1) (1, -2) (1, -5) 
N2 (-1, -1) (-1, -1) (-1, -1) (-1, -1) 
N3 (1, -5) (1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 4) 
N4 (-1, -1) (-1, -1) (-1, -1) (-1, -1) 
 
The two best outcomes for Receiver occur in blocks that are also best outcomes for Sender, 
<N1,K1> and <N3,K4>, but Sender is indifferent between those. These squares are Nash 
Equilibria because neither player can do better, given that play of the other, by going to some 
other square. However, they are not strict because neither of these dominates all options for 
Sender. 
We can find a strict Nash Equilibrium by focusing more closely on the fact that in our 
game Sender is Nature. It is her laws that determine how she responds to states of the world 
and produces indicators for them; N1 and N3 are two different possible sets of laws that are 
equally capable of delivering separating evidence, and that is all we took to matter to her. Yet 
in a real game Nature, as usually conceived, does not change her laws with each round. She 
would have chosen N1 or N3 in the beginning, and the repeated game would be a degenerate 
one that Receiver plays against the background of that one strategy. (In a moment we will see 
that he plays it in competition with other receivers.) If we assume that the world has only one 
set of physical laws, then either N1 or N3 will be the unique play Nature always makes. If so, 
then either K1 or K4 (depending on which laws Nature chose) will be the unique best 
response of Receiver, and either <N1, K1> or <N3, K4> will be a strict Nash Equilibrium. 
Since there is symmetry, we can suppose without loss of generality that Nature chose 
strategy N1. The state of the world remains as it was, potentially changing in each round 
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between p and -p. Now Sender (Nature) is a degenerate player who is like a set of 
background conditions, and the game that is left involves a confrontation between the 
Receiving strategies. We can rewrite this as a non-degenerate game by imagining many 
Receivers playing with each other. They meet two by two, round by round, each does his 
thing with Nature and each gets a certain payoff determined by what his payoff was in the 
previous table when playing against N1. It is not that these two players necessarily interact or 
oppose each other, simply that each may do better or worse than or the same as the other with 
which he is paired in a given round; each competes to get higher payoffs than the opponent, 
as in darts, but not necessarily as in football. What we are now doing is comparing what 
one’s outcomes in the True Belief game would be were one to be this kind of Receiver or 
that. There are four types of Receiver, each defined by his strategy when faced with N1: 
 
 K1 K2 K3 K4 
K1 (4, 4) (4, 1) (4, -2) (4, -5) 
K2 (1, 4) (1, 1) (1, -2) (1, -5) 
K3 (-2, 4) (-2, 1) (-2, -2) (-2, -5) 
K4 (-5, 4) (-5, 1) (-5, -2) (-5, -5) 
 
K1 dominates all other possibilities – it does better than every other possibility in the payoffs 
– and so is a strict Nash Equilibrium. It is a consequence of this that if you were to always 
play K1, i.e. play that in every round of the game, then you would always do better than if 
you had played any other possible strategy. That is, it is not only that a true belief has value 
but that there is a unique strategy that will deliver a correct belief state no matter what, in 
particular no matter whether p is true or false (and even if the strategy is offered a million 
dollars to do otherwise). This added general guarantee over several dimensions of possible 
variation is what will yield an answer to our value question about knowledge, as I will 
discuss after relating the present concept of strategies to theories of knowledge. 
In this latest game we imagined an individual player being of a certain type, 
corresponding to a strategy, and him having a true or false, or lack of, belief in each round. I 
will explain below how what his strategy is can add value, in each round, to his having 
actually achieved a true belief. This is an advantage that accrues to an individual when he is 
of a favorable type, but the very same facts also guarantee a value added for a population of 
individuals of his type. The reason is that a strict Nash Equilibrium in a symmetric game like 
this one is an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS). This is a notion used to evaluate the fate 
of subpopulations of uniform types, here four subpopulations for the four types of Receiver 
for whom true belief about p is valuable. The proportions of these types in the population 
change with each round as any individual player’s strategy in the next round will be the one 
determined to be the best by set rules of interaction dynamics applied to his and possibly 
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others’ outcome(s) in this round. The question, as with biological evolution, is how the 
proportions of the four types evolve with each generation or round of play. The interesting 
implication of a strategy’s being an ESS is that if it comes to be widespread in the population, 
it will be uninvadable by a mutant strategy; that is, no other single strategy that exists or 
arose in small numbers could drive this type to extinction.vi This is a powerful property 
because it holds, when it does, no matter what the dynamics of interaction are as the game 
evolves from round to round (and there are a potentially infinite number of possible 
interaction dynamics). The basic upshot of this for our case is that if the K1 strategy gets a 
good start it will be the unique type that rebuffs every competitor in the True Belief Game. 
The value, and relative value, of the K1 strategy is the key to answering the value 
problem for the tracking view of knowledge. We can see what K1 has to do with probabilistic 
tracking, and knowledge, by looking more closely at what a strategy is and what the winning 
strategies in the True Belief game look like. Assuming, as above, that Nature chose N1 for her 
laws, K1 is an ESS and strict Nash Equilibrium (sNE): 
 
N1: p  M1 -p  M2 
K1: M1  B(p) M2  - B(p) 
 
Since N1 is simply assumed to be the case, the player who always uses K1 has a relation to 
the world, that is, to p and -p, that we can think of as a result of the combined rules N1 and 
K1. The arrows in these diagrams are normally written in terms of conditional probabilities. 
So, in the simplest terms, a commitment to following the K1 strategy on assumption of N1 
would be written:  
 
Pr(M1/p) = very high, and Pr(B(p)/M1) = very high   * 
Pr(M2/-p) = very high, and Pr(-B(p)/M2) = very high  ** 
 
Notice the similarity of * and ** to the two probabilistic tracking conditionsvii, respectively:  
 
Pr(B(p)/p) is high       † 
Pr(-B(p)/-p) is high       ‡ 
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The two sets of conditions cannot be unconditionally identified because conditional 
probability is not transitive. However, under the following screening off conditions: 
 
Pr(B(p)/p.M1) = Pr(B(p)/M1) and 
Pr(-B(p)/-p.M2) = Pr(-B(p)/M2) 
 
which intuitively say that M1, M2 are the only messages Receiver is getting about p, * and ** 
imply † and ‡ respectively. (See Appendix.) That is, if you are a faithful follower of the Strict 
Nash Equilibrium or Evolutionarily Stable Strategy for a given p in the True Belief game, 
then you fulfill the tracking conditions on knowledge for that p. This means that no theory of 
knowledge that does not impose the tracking conditions implies that knowledge gives us an 
ESS or sNE. If following the rule of an ESS or sNE adds value to having a true belief, then it 
is a value that only tracking can give. Other conditions on knowledge may have other (non-
tracking) properties that make knowledge more valuable than mere true belief and thus 
address the swamping problem, but those properties must be strictly logically weaker than 
ESS or sNE, and they will not dominate in the True Belief game, a representation that does 
seem a fair way of depicting what our task is in forming beliefs.  
To see the other direction of relationship between the tracking conditions and the True 
Belief ESS and sNE conditions, we must consider that the tracking conditions are highly 
abstract, even more abstract than our imagined signaling game. Magic could be the 
truthmaker of the counterfactual conditions if magic existed. They involve no requirements 
that there exist a process of belief formation, or causal connection, the things we familiarly 
use to get to a knowledge state. How a subject manages to achieve fulfillment of the tracking 
conditions is not restricted by these conditions for what knowledge is. However, it happens to 
be a contingent fact about human beings that we can’t fulfill the tracking conditions without 
intermediaries: causal processes, one event indicating another, one trait correlated with 
another, our eyes, our brains, having dispositions to respond differentially, testimony of 
witnesses, etc. The minimal description of what these intermediaries give to us that is 
sufficient to insure tracking is indicators playing the role of messages, M1 and M2 in a 
signaling system. Thus, what we can say is that if a human being fulfills the tracking 
conditions for a given p then there are M1, M2 such that she has an ESS and a sNE. 
Having had your belief formed through a reliable process does not imply that your 
belief also has the tracking properties. Nor does the counterfactual property of safety. (Roush 
2005, 118-126) Being justified in your beliefs, or virtuous, also do not yield tracking. 
(Neither do the advocates of these conditions intend them to.) These alternatives to tracking 
are all nice properties, but they do not give you an ESS. However, one might be bothered 
about the fact that none of those conditions implies strategy K2, K3, or K4 either. Having used 
a reliable process doesn’t insure that you would believe p if p were true, but it doesn’t 
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guarantee that if it were true you wouldn’t believe it either. Are we really comparing actual 
theories of knowledge at all in the True Belief game?  
None of the other theories’ conditions on knowledge imply any single one of the four 
pure strategies, yet they – and every other possible set of conditions – are taken account of in 
our game. Any set of conditions for knowledge that a subject fulfills will have consequences 
for whether or how often, or likely it is that, the subject will end up believing p when p is true 
and avoiding belief when p is false, with possibly different probabilities depending on a 
variety of conditions. Having formed your belief in p through a reliable process need not 
imply that you will believe p when it is false in order to confer some probability of doing so 
given the way the actual world works, or under certain conditions. Being justified in 
whatever way one prefers may not imply your avoiding belief in p when p is false given the 
way the actual world works, but there may be some, even significant, probability, .x, of it, 
and thus a 1-x probability of believing p when p is false.viii Similarly for the other rules in the 
True Belief game. In this way, any conditions on knowledge that are added to the truth and 
belief conditions is represented as some “mixed strategy” in the True Belief game. It is a fact 
that because K1 is a sNE and ESS, it not only cannot be invaded by any of the other pure 
strategies K2 – K4, but none of the mixed strategies can invade it either. So the uniqueness of 
tracking as an ESS (sNE) is completely general over theories of knowledge that see 
knowledge as true belief plus a further condition. There may be conditions that are not the 
tracking conditions but do imply them, and those conditions would also count as an ESS 
(sNE). But since it would be only in virtue of implying the tracking conditions that they 
guaranteed that stability, it is still the tracking that confers the value that an ESS and a sNE 
bring.ix 
When speaking of strategies in these games I have used locutions in which the players 
play a strategy or follow a rule, because they are less misleading than talk about choosing 
options, since the former can be done unconsciously. When a subject needs to know p she 
rarely just finds herself choosing between her tracking option and other options that could 
lead to error. There are matters on which a human being does come naturally equipped with a 
tracking ability – e.g., her eyes can track whether there is a tiger in front of her – but in those 
cases we would not think of her as, and she would not typically be, choosing to use her eyes. 
Her doing that is automatic. In nonperceptual cases the subject often would choose the 
tracking option if she could, but it is not just there for the choosing. A scientist would have to 
build a hadron collider in order to set up a set of messages that distinguish, for example, the 
existence and non-existence of the particle of interest. Journalists, and many other types of 
knowledge-seekers, have to do work to set up a tracking relation with the truth of interest. 
Even the locutions of “playing a strategy” and “following a rule” can be misleading for the 
non-automatic cases to the extent that they suggest a mere decision. 
We can think of these strategies in the True Belief game as rules that with repeated 
achievement and use can become dispositions of subjects, but the notion of following a rule 
has an ambiguity worth clarifying here too. One may follow a rule that corresponds to one of 
the strategies by using its response types in a given round of play. However, that does not 
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correspond to tracking; tracking corresponds to playing or following that strategy or rule as a 
habit or disposition with respect to p – it requires that a player is of a type. 
How a subject can or does get herself into the position of having strategies available is 
not a concern of this game-theoretic analysis. One may stumble into doing a tracking type 
play, one may be automatically disposed to it, one may make a herculean effort to get to be 
able to choose and commit to use it. Also, it is the same if you had a strategy available and 
didn’t use it or didn’t use it because you didn’t have it. What matters to the outcomes and 
stability properties is only whether one acts in accord with a particular rule, and whether one 
is or becomes disposed to do so. This restriction of attention does not limit the relevance of 
these results to epistemology, however, since how one gets oneself into the state of 
knowledge, despite being a question of central interest in epistemology, is not per se a topic 
relevant to the questions whether one is in that state or not and what is required for counting 
as being in that state. A particular view of the criteria for being in that state may stipulate that 
how one got there matters to whether one is in the state – genetic views of what knowledge 
is, like process reliabilism, do that – but that is a choice of a particular theory, not a 
requirement for having an answer at all to the question what knowledge is. Counterfactual 
theories care only about what your properties now say that you would believe in an alternate 
situation or whether what you would believe in an alternate situation would be true. What 
many internalist justification views of knowledge care about is whether you currently have 
reasons available. The concern in the value problem too, just like the concern of the True 
Belief game, is not how you got to your knowledge, or your capacity to have strategies at all, 
but what it is you now have by being there. 
What does it follow that you have on the tracking view when you have achieved 
knowledge? What follows is whatever follows from having true belief in p and the strong 
disposition to follow the strategy that is the unique strict Nash Equilibrium and the unique 
ESS in the True Belief game for p. The dominance of your strategy – its being a sNE – brings 
a number of properties with it. It brings generality over rounds of play: you will win in every 
round of the True Belief game (except those few stages where you play out of character – 
your disposition to follow K1 is not assumed perfect). You will always get a higher payoff 
than any other strategy could get you. Winning a round doesn’t necessarily give you 
knowledge because it does not necessarily bring you belief. The state of the world may be p 
or -p, and if it is -p then your winning will come from the clause of your strategy that makes 
you not believe in such circumstances. However, this absence of belief is valuable too, we 
assumed, the most valuable thing you could do given that state of the world. 
Having knowledge, on the tracking view, implies having a true belief and along with 
it a disposition that would make you have the epistemic state – belief or non-belief – that is 
most valuable given the state of the world, in almost every round, were you to play the True 
Belief game an infinite number of times. This security may sound so simple as to be trivial, 
but its power lies in the fact that in an infinite number of rounds of play the game could have 
an infinite number of different manifestations. As long as the payoff structure holds constant, 
having your sNE means you will win in all the remotely probable manifestations. What kinds 
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of variation could there be? It could be that in the actual case of your true belief that a 
particular road is the road to Larissa you are not having a discussion with a sophist, but in 
another round though it still is the road to Larissa you are also stopped along the way by a 
wily, argumentative guy. If in addition to having a true belief you are a K1 -type subject on 
the matter of this road, then you would believe it both were you to be talking to a sophist and 
were you not. If the sophist were to give you a bad argument that it is not the road to Larissa 
then you, the K1 type, wouldn’t give up your belief. Being K1 implies that somehow or other 
you would know better. The subject with a mere true belief would be a sitting duck for the 
sophistical trick.  
In this case the truth value of p did not vary from the actual, but the circumstances 
did. There could also be a variation in truth value of p over different rounds. Though this is in 
fact now the road to Larissa, there could be a round of the game where it isn’t. If a person 
merely has a true belief that this is the road then nothing follows about whether she would 
pick up on the circumstance where it wasn’t. There may be signs and trustworthy authorities 
to tell people where the road goes instead, but being a mere true believer gives no insurance 
that you would pick up on them. The K1 type of subject, by contrast, is prepared to have an 
appropriate belief state even if there turns out to be road work. 
The counterfactual properties that flow from living in a strict Nash Equilibrium give 
the subject who has knowledge preparedness for all probable circumstances and changes in 
the truth value of p. However, we have said that properties of the history of a belief cannot 
save a view of knowledge from the swamping problem, so one might wonder how properties 
of the subject’s potential future could; why isn’t the problem symmetric in time? The basic 
reason is that time flows in one direction. Everything from the past that is relevant to 
epistemic success now has had its chance to be taken into account in the actual present belief; 
what the future may hold cannot have been captured already in that belief. And this is not 
only because the future has not actually happened yet, but also because what does happen in 
it will not be determined exclusively by the subject’s currently believing or even by that 
belief’s truth. There are a million other present and future conditions not determined by this 
belief or its truth. What the subject will do in response to those circumstances is also not 
determined by her actually having a true belief now. Her having a disposition to a strategy in 
the True Belief game does (probabilistically) determine this. 
Being K1 now does add something now that is identifiable and not redundant with 
merely having a true belief, but we can still ask whether that thing is valuable. This comes 
down to the question whether preparedness is valuable, since what being type K1 now gives 
is robustness of epistemic success against future contingencies. It seems to me undeniable 
that preparedness has added value, since denying it would require denying that true belief has 
extrinsic value at any time before it is actually being used. If the value of a true belief is that 
it aids you in achieving something else, then it is valuable at the times when it is actually 
aiding you, but it would not be valuable at any earlier time unless we supposed that the 
potential for aiding was also valuable. If we denied that preparedness is valuable then the true 
belief about which is the road to Larissa wouldn’t be valuable at all except at those times 
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when we were actually walking on the road with the intention of going to Larissa. We don’t 
think that, so preparedness is valuable.1 The preparedness that K1, or tracking, brings is not 
redundant with the potential a mere true belief brings, since whatever success the current 
mere true belief might give the subject in the future will be dominated in payoffs by what the 
tracking true belief brings. Thus, tracking is both additional and valuable. 
The security that the dynamical stability property of tracking brings is a form of 
persistence over time, and the value of knowledge over true belief has been associated by 
some, including Socrates, with persistence. The difference between the current view and the 
others is in what is expected to persist when you have knowledge of p. Socrates compared 
true belief with the statues of Daedalus, magnificent creations but they run away if not tied 
down. Mere true belief will not stay around long either, Socrates said, unless it is tethered, in 
his view by working out the reason. (Meno, 97d – 98a) Timothy Williamson has fleshed this 
idea out by arguing that knowledge is literally more persistent than true belief in part because 
it is less susceptible to rational undermining. (Williamson 2000, 79) Kvanvig (2003, 13-20) 
argues against this, and despairs of the prospects for any persistence view of the added value 
of knowledge. What everyone is missing is that it is not true belief, or knowledge, that will 
persist in virtue of one’s having knowledge. It is not even appropriate for a theory of 
knowledge to imply that knowledge of any contingent truth persists, or is likely to persist, 
because the truth of a contingent truth cannot be expected to persist.x Roads change, tigers 
come back, and I’m afraid that chocolate shops sometimes go out of business. 
If you have a list of truths about where the chocolate shops are in town, an example 
due to Kvanvig, then you have something valuable (if you like chocolate), but you do not, he 
points out, have something more valuable if you have the intersection of this list with a list of 
where the chocolate shops are likely to be. However I do have something more valuable if I 
have in addition to a list of truths about where the chocolate shops are a responsiveness to 
their probabilities of going out of business over the next month, quarter, and year; I will be 
disposed now to try them differentially in the future in a way that insures more success and 
efficiency in getting my chocolate. If a mere true belief that I have now, before deciding 
which direction to walk to get my chocolate, is valuable to me because it raises my chances 
of getting chocolate, then my having now a responsiveness of my beliefs to future closings is 
of value too, and it is evidently not redundant. 
 What persists over time for a K1-type believer in p, is not knowledge or belief that p, 
there is a chocolate shop at a certain place, but appropriateness of epistemic state – belief or 
non-belief in p – over time and changing circumstances. The appropriateness is cashed out in 
my getting the highest payoff a player could get no matter the state of the world, p or - p. And 
payoffs, of course, are not restricted to non-essential pleasures. They may be food vs. no 
food, shelter or health care vs. none; they may be any of the goods, services, and cooperative 
relationships that are relevant to survival. Provided the payoff structure of the game remains 
                                                 
1 There are other epistemological cases of the added value of preparedness. Many internalists think that having 
an argument consciously accessible is valuable, but even if an argument that is being used is valuable an 
argument that is merely accessible and is not actually being used wouldn’t have value if preparedness had no 
value. 
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the same, the knower type gets the highest payoff that any type could get, and is highly likely 
to do so in the future, in every round of play; baldly put, the K1-type believer is more likely to 
survive and flourish. Since persistence and advantage are intuitive features of the value of 
knowledge, remarked upon by philosophers of various persuasions, the fact that K1 insures a 
sensible version of them is a point in favor of tracking as a theory of what knowledge is. 
The value of knowledge I have been discussing so far flows from K1 being a strict 
Nash Equilibrium and what follows from this about the fate of an individual who is a tracker 
in comparison to individuals of other types. That K1 is an ESS brings in a further dimension 
that seems to have explanatory force when applied to human populations over time, even 
historical and evolutionary time. An ESS type has a resistance to extinction. In our game this 
means that, if payoffs remain the same over generations of play, then a widespread 
subpopulation of knowers of p cannot be eliminated – as a type – by any small population of 
any style of ignoramus-type. This holds, recall, no matter what the dynamics of interaction or 
variations in circumstance. 
One might think of this in connection with the ideas that education brings greater 
success, that the truth will prevail, that an educated population will be less likely to enact 
policies that will lead to its own destruction, that though the meek may inherit the earth the 
ignorant will not. We might associate it with hope that Karl Rove was wrong to express 
disdain for the “reality-based community,” people who "believe that solutions emerge from 
your judicious study of discernible reality," that he was wrong to think that "That's not the 
way the world really works anymore. We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our 
own reality.” (Suskind 2004) We might think of the hope that flat-out false beliefs will not 
determine the outcomes of elections, or of Congressional policy votes.  
These hopes are often thought of as naïve, but the ESS property of knowledge gives 
them some basis. A subpopulation of organisms of a type that has tiger detection in an 
environment that has tigers that like to eat them, and which is a large fraction of the total 
population of such organisms, will never be outcompeted as a type – that is, eliminated as 
aproportion of the entire population – by a small subpopulation of organisms that lack tiger-
detection. This case is clean because the connection between accurate representation of 
reality and positive relative payoff is direct, and  the payoffs are not imagined as changing in 
the course of repeated play. In such cases knowledge, or its counterparts involving tracking 
via more primitive representations than belief, will have a ratchet effect on the evolution of 
species. If a knowledge-bearing type of organism arises and goes to fixation – “everybody” 
knows – then no ignorant variant within the species can stop the future survival of the knower 
type. It is worth emphasizing that an ESS insures nothing about the fate of individuals – that 
is a concern we dealt with earlier in the context of an sNE. In interpreting what it means to 
say that the knower-type will not be driven to extinction, it seems most natural to say that 
knowledge is what will survive; this is not quite true, but close: what will survive is belief 
states appropriate to the potentially changing states of the world with respect to p, which of 
course requires lack of belief in p when p is false. This will survive despite potentially being 
borne by different individuals in each round of play. 
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In human history and culture, the knower type, or even a large population of them, 
does not always prevail. We can explain the consistency of this with a tracking view of 
knowledge by the fact that human beings have capacities that can lead to failure of the 
conditions for the ESS outcome. One such condition is that the payoff structure of the game 
remain constant over repeated play; repeated play, in political contexts for example, often 
changes the payoffs. If one despises Karl Rove then it will be at least partly because of his 
evaluative claim that we are permitted to change reality however we please if we have 
enough power. However, he was right in the factual claim that human actions can change 
reality, not only in the obvious sense that occurs when we build bridges, but also because 
human actions can change payoff structures.  
For example, in a pitched public battle over a government policy, people with enough 
resources and cleverness can blanket the media with messages psychologically well-crafted 
to convince the populace of outright falsehoods, with the goal of making them proponents or 
opponents of the policy. The best payoff for a member of Congress deliberating over whether 
to vote for the policy might have been determined by whether it truly would improve the 
lives of his constituents, because after all even if his only concern was re-election his 
constituents’ well-being would be the thing that determined whether they voted for him – 
right? However, if the election is soon and the consequences of the policy will emerge more 
slowly, and the member of Congress doesn’t have the resources to counter sufficiently the 
falsehoods that his constituents have come through aggressive advertising to believe, then 
what is truly in their best interest will not be determining their vote in the next election. The 
member of Congress now has the highest payoff from voting in the direction of policy that 
will not help his constituents. 
For any p a true belief in which is valuable, etc., the knower type, if in sufficient 
numbers, will survive as long as conditions relevant to payoffs remain the same. We can see 
through empirical examples that one condition for their remaining the same is that there be no 
relevant deception. However, this amounts to saying that the mere having of knowledge by 
many people will not prevent the damaging consequences of deception, and it is not 
surprising that overcoming the effects of outright obfuscation on a system of interaction will 
require not just knowledge but also countermeasures.  
It is an understatement to say that among human beings the applicability of the ESS 
result will not be universal; it is a result in an idealization that has the kind of usefulness such 
tools bring. We have seen that the idealization implies that even perfect knowledge does not 
alone give us everything we need epistemically, which conforms to the well-known fact that 
knowledge does not give us everything. However, we also know that knowledge gives a lot, 
and the tracking view of what knowledge is provides a simple and powerful picture for 
explaining what and how that is. 
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Appendix 
From  
Pr(M1/p) = very high 
Pr(B(p)/M1) = very high (*) 
and 
Pr(B(p)/p.M1) = Pr(B(p)/M1) 
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we wish to derive 
Pr(B(p)/p) is high (†) 
 
By (*), 
Pr(M1 . p)  Pr(p) 
Pr(B(p) . M1)  Pr(M1) (!) 
 
Pr(B(p)/p.M1) = Pr(B(p)/M1) 
implies 
Pr(B(p) . p . M1)/Pr(p . M1) = Pr(B(p) . M1)/Pr(M1) 
 
By !, 
Pr(B(p) . p . M1)/Pr(p . M1)  1 
which implies 
Pr(B(p)/p . M1)  1. 
but by ! 
Pr(M1 . p)  Pr(p) 
so 
Pr(B(p)/p)  1. 
 
Two approximate equalities were used in the derivation of the final inequality, so there are 
two sources damping down the final correlation and it will be strictly lower. This is why I 
claim only that high tracking correlations come from very high signaling system correlations 
rather than that very high comes from very high. The derivation for the second half of 
strategy K1 is analogous. The nature of probabilistic tracking is discussed in Roush (2005); 
lower bounds on the loss of correlation over tracking links are shown in Chapter 5, where the 
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links are chains of evidence. Both parts of a strategy like K1 are actually tracking conditions, 
though not the specific ones about p and B(p) that we use to analyze knowledge. 
 
 
                                                 
i This work was supported by NSF Award No. SES - 0823418. Special thanks to Jason 
Alexander for helpful discussions, and to Brian Skyrms for teaching me most of what I know 
about game theory. 
ii We may wonder, though, why in the case of really beautiful chairs having been designed or 
made by an artist or establishment who usually makes very beautiful chairs tends to make the 
chair sold under that label have higher market value. 
iii The particular numbers are important here only for some of the ordinal relationships: the 
payoff for a true belief must be greater than that for no belief when p is true, and no belief 
must be of greater value than belief when p is false. How much greater may be different with 
the two types of mistake one might make, depending on how costly a false positive or false 
negative is for the subject.  
iv Such an assumption would anyway trivialize the representation. The question would then 
be If the subject knows that Nature made p true, should she believe p? Since knowledge 
implies true belief the answer would be automatic – she already would believe it – and the 
representation would swing independent of whether true belief has value or not.  
v That is, since there isn’t a strict Nash Equilibrium there will be no evolutionarily stable 
strategy (ESS). The notion of ESS makes sense for this asymmetric game if we think of 
ourselves as referring to its symmetric counterpart in which every player has both a sender 
strategy and a receiver strategy which he or she plays depending on whether he or she is 
assigned the role of sender or receiver in a given round of play. All of the claims about 
stability in the Watching football game should be taken to be referring to that symmetric 
game. 
vi Two player types could successfully gang up on an ESS, so an ESS is uninvadable, but not 
unbeatable. The mixed strategies discussed below are not equivalent to two strategies 
ganging up in the relevant way. 
vii See Roush (2005) for a fuller discussion of these conditions. 
viii If there are no such probabilities for how fulfillment of a proposed requirement for 
knowledge would make you do in the task of believing p when p and not believing when -p, 
then the requirement has no truth connection at all, and so could not invade our tracking-
based strategy anyway. 
ix Tracking with closure (Roush 2005) is weaker than tracking because it allows one also to 
know p in virtue merely of tracking some q which one knows implies p. On that view 
knowing p would not imply one had an ESS for p. However, knowing p would imply that 
either one had an ESS for p or one had an ESS for some q that implies p.  
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x The truth of necessary truths does, of course, persist, so tracking is not the appropriate kind 
of responsiveness to have to necessary truths. The appropriate kind is proposed and defended 
in Roush (2005, 134-147). 
